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THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT:
CONGRESS'S LATEST ATTEMPT TO REGULATE
SPEECH ON THE INTERNET
Jill Jacobson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a unique, new global communication me-
dium of unprecedented proportions. This medium provides a
low-cost, virtually instantaneous way for people to communi-
cate with a worldwide audience in a variety of different for-
mats.' "This dynamic, multifaceted category of communica-
tion includes not only traditional print and news services, but
also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-
time dialogue."' The Internet has experienced explosive
growth in recent years. "The number of U.S. homes with
Internet connections has leaped from less than 6 million in
1994 to almost 39 million this year and [is] estimated [to
reach] 60 million in 2003....
This comment addresses the recent attempt by Congress
to regulate speech on the Internet via the Child Online Pro-
tection Act ("COPA").4 The COPA purports to restrict access
by minors to commercially provided sexually explicit material
on the Internet. The COPA has been challenged as an uncon-
stitutional restraint on speech, and recently a federal district
court granted a motion for a preliminary injunction against
its enforcement, pending a final adjudication on the merits.5
* Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 40. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; Ph.D., University of California, Los An-
geles; B.S., Ohio State University.
1. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
2. Id.
3. Jon Healey, Fiber Optics Light the Way for Rapid Growth of the Internet,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 4, 1999, at 4F.
4. See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998).
5. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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Case law regarding acceptable parameters for regulation of
the Internet is scant, because the medium has only recently
become a popular means of expression However, in 1997,
the United States Supreme Court struck down a predecessor
of the COPA, the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"). The
COPA is Congress's response to the Court's criticisms of the
CDA and represents a Congressional attempt to draft legisla-
tion more likely to pass constitutional muster Although
narrower in scope than the CDA, the COPA is a content-
based restriction on speech and must survive strict scrutiny
to be held constitutional To prevail under strict scrutiny,
the COPA must be a narrowly-tailored means of achieving
the government's stated objective of protecting minors from
harmful material on the Internet.
This comment evaluates the constitutionality of the
COPA and proposes an alternate type of Internet regulation
that is less likely to infringe upon individuals' rights to free-
dom of expression. Part II of this comment provides the per-
tinent background material for analyzing the COPA. Part
II.A discusses the history of First Amendment jurisprudence
with respect to various forms of communication media. Part
II.B discusses the history of the Internet and describes the
types of content that are available through this medium.
Part II.C describes various means for regulating Internet con-
tent and discusses the background of both the CDA and the
COPA. Part III of this comment identifies the constitutional
issues raised by passage of the COPA. Part IV, divided into
three sections, presents an analysis of the COPA with respect
to First Amendment rights. Part IV.A compares the provi-
sions of the COPA to those of the CDA. Part IV.B subjects
the COPA to a strict scrutiny analysis, finding that it fails
this test. Part IV.C compares the COPA to "adult zoning"
regulations that have been upheld by the Supreme Court.
Finally, Part V proposes a regulatory scheme that is distinct
in nature from either the CDA or the COPA and could be en-
6. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text.
7. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (a)-(e) (West Supp. 1997) (struck down as unconstitu-
tional in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775 (1998) (visited Dec. 21, 1998)
<http'//www.epic.org/freespeechl
censorship/hr3783-report.html>.
9. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989). For a discussion of strict scrutiny, see infra Part II.A. 1.
222 [Vol. 40
1999] CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT 223
acted without abridging adults' rights to receive constitution-
ally protected speech via the Internet.
II. BACKGROUND
A. First Amendment Rights
1. Freedom of Speech-Rights and Limitations
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech. . . ."" Freedom of speech is the corner-
stone of individual liberty and of our form of democracy." By
encouraging public discussion of competing views and ideas,
the First Amendment guarantees and promotes an unfettered
"free trade in ideas."" "At the heart of the First Amendment
is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free
flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and
concern." 3 For this reason, the U.S. Supreme Court subjects
laws regulating speech to a strict scrutiny analysis, 4 and
deems any law regulating speech on the basis of its content
presumptively invalid.'5
The right to free speech, however, is not without limit. 6
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 859 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd 521
U.S. 844 (1977). "[Tlhe preservation of [protected speech]... has been extolled
by court after court in case after case as the keystone, the bulwark, the very
heart of our democracy." Id.
12. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., con-
curring in the result). "The First Amendment guarantees liberty of human ex-
pression in order to preserve in our Nation what Mr. Justice Holmes called a
'free trade in ideas.' To that end, the Constitution protects more than just a
man's freedom to say or write or publish what he wants. It secures as well the
liberty of each man to decide for himself what he will read and to what he will
listen." Id.
13. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
14. See, e.g., ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851; Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of
Trustees, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
15. See, e.g., ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 858; R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 381 (1992) ("Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.")
Id. at 382.
16. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which
it is done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not pro-
tect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It
does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words
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The Supreme Court has held that in certain circumstances,
the First Amendment right to freedom of speech may be su-
perceded by a compelling government interest. 7 In these
cases, the Court has held that "[t]he benefit gained [by a con-
tent-based restriction] must outweigh the loss of constitution-
ally protected rights."8 Some types of speech are unprotected
by the First Amendment. Examples of unprotected speech in-
clude obscenity, 9 child pornography, ° libel against private
citizens,2' speech calculated to provoke a fight,22 and incite-
ment to imminent unlawful acts.2' Regulation of speech not
in one of the unprotected categories is examined under strict
scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires that a regulation be "justi-
fied by a compelling government interest and.., narrowly
tailored to effectuate that interest."
24
Regulations, even if serving a compelling government
objective, are unconstitutional if they are either overbroad or
too vaguely worded. 5 An overbroad law, even if serving a le-
gitimate end, is not constitutional because it sweeps protected
speech within its ambit along with the unprotected speech
that is the target of the regulation. 6 Vaguely worded laws
are likewise unconstitutional. Vagueness in the language of a
statute is a violation of due process 27 and the Supreme Court
that may have all the effect of force. The question in every case is
whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
Id. (citations omitted).
17. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989).
18. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363
(1976)).
19. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978). "Obscene materi-
als have been denied the protection of the First Amendment because their con-
tent is so offensive to contemporary moral standards." Id. (citation omitted); see
also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
20. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
21. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
22. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
23. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
24. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 851 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd 521 U.S. 844
(1977).
25. See Stephen C. Jacques, Comment, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Inter-
net, the First Amendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1945,
1953-54 (1997).
26. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463. U.S. 60, 73-74 (1983);
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
27. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 860. "[A] statute which either forbids or re-
224 [Vol. 40
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has held such statutes "void for vagueness."28 "[N]o one may
be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as
to the meaning of penal statutes....
2. First Amendment Rights with Respect to
Communication Media
In this era of mass communication, the Supreme Court
has taken a "medium-specific" approach to determining the
constitutionally appropriate level of regulation for each new
form of media. ° In this way, the Court "translates" the val-
ues that the Framers had in mind when they wrote the First
Amendment into the context of each new medium that the
Court examines." This allows the Court to preserve "consti-
tutional fidelity" in light of new technologies that did not ex-
ist when the Constitution was written.2
Historically, the highest level of constitutional protection
3has been afforded to speech conveyed through print, a me-
dium that existed at the time the Constitution was drafted. 4
"The Court has consistently spoken forcefully on the critical
role the print medium plays in advancing a robust national
debate." 5
However, the stringent protections for speech in the print
medium are not absolute. In Ginsberg v. New York, the Su-
quires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates
the first essential of due process of law." Id. (quoting Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
28. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). "It is a basic
principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibi-
tions are not clearly defined." Id.
29. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 860 (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451, 453 (1939)).
30. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). "We have long
recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment
problems." Id.
31. See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY
L.J. 869, 873 (1996).
32. See id.
33. See Miami Herald Publ'g v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1973) (White, J.
concurring).
34. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-25, at
1003 (2d ed. 1988). "The First Amendment guarantee of freedom from govern-
ment intrusion reigns most confidently in the realm of the print media, since
newspapers and pamphlets were the most significant modes of mass communi-
cation in the world of the Framers." Id.
35. Jacques, supra note 25, at 1956 (citations omitted).
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preme Court considered the constitutionality of a New York
statute that prohibited the sale of materials deemed "harmful
to minors" to persons under age seventeen. 6 The appellants
were prosecuted and convicted of selling sexually explicit
magazines to a sixteen-year-old boy on two separate occa-
sions, in violation of the statute.3 7 The Supreme Court held
that although the magazines in question were not obscene for
adults,38 "[miaterial which is protected for distribution to
adults is not necessarily constitutionally protected from re-
striction upon its dissemination to children. In other words,
the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary
according to the group to whom the questionable material is
directed... ."9 The Court found that the state of New York
had a compelling interest in the well-being of its children4 °
and that the statutory limitations on availability of sexually
explicit material to minors were justified on two grounds.
First, the Court stated that "constitutional interpretation has
consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in
their own household to direct the rearing of their children is
basic in the structure of our society." 1 The Court concluded
that the legislature could properly find that "exposure to ma-
terial condemned by the statute is harmful to minors"" and
that "parents and others ... who have [a] primary responsi-
bility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of
laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."3 Sec-
ond, although minors were barred from purchasing material
prohibited by the statute, persons seventeen years of age and
older were not barred from purchasing the same material.44
Parents who desired to provide the prohibited material for
their children could purchase it for them without violating
36. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
37. See id. at 631.
38. See id. at 634.
39. Id. at 636 (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671
(N.Y. 1966)).
40. See id. at 639.
41. Id. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither [support] nor hinder." Id.
(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
42. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.
43. Id. at 639.
44. See id. at 634-35.
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the statute.45
At the opposite end of the constitutional spectrum from
print, the broadcast media traditionally receive the least
amount of First Amendment protection.46 In FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, Inc., the Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether "indecent" speech conveyed via a radio broadcast is
protected under the First Amendment.47 In Pacifica Founda-
tion, the speech in question consisted of a satiric monologue
by comedian George Carlin, entitled "Filthy Words."48 In this
monologue, Carlin listed and repeated "words you couldn't
say on the public . . . airwaves" in a variety of verbal con-
texts.4'9 Respondent Pacifica Foundation, as part of a radio
broadcast about contemporary society's attitude toward lan-
guage, aired the monologue at two o'clock on a weekday af-
ternoon.0 A man who heard the monologue while driving
with his young son filed a complaint the FCC. Although the
FCC did not impose formal sanctions, it issued a Declaratory
Order in which it ruled that it had the power to regulate
speech that was "indecent" or "patently offensive," such as the
Carlin monologue, even though such speech was not ob-
scene." The FCC derived its regulatory authority from two
separate statutes: "18 U.S.C. § 1464 which forbids the use of
'any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communications,' and 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) which requires the
Commission to 'encourage the larger and more effective use of
radio in the public interest."'52 The court of appeals over-
turned the FCC order and the FCC appealed to the Supreme
Court.
In Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court first consid-
ered whether regulation of "indecent" speech was constitu-
tionally permissible under any circumstances.53 The Court
concluded that offensive speech such as the Carlin monologue
45. See id. at 639.
46. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). "[O]f all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection." Id.
47. See id. at 744.
48. Id. at 751-55.
49. See id. at 729.
50. See id. at 729-30.
51. See id. at 731.
52. Pacifica Found., 483 U.S. at 731.
53. See id. at 744.
1999] 227
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"is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all
circumstances."54 Therefore, the court considered the context
in which the offensive speech was broadcast in determining
the constitutionality of the FCC's actions.5 The Court upheld
the FCC's "nuisance rationale"56 for determining whether the
broadcast of the indecent speech in question occurred in an
appropriate context and held that the FCC acted within con-
stitutional boundaries." The Court gave two reasons for im-
posing stricter content-based regulation on broadcast media
than on other forms of media:
First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans. Patently
offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves
confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the
privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left
alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder. Because the broadcast audience is constantly
tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely pro-
tect the listener or viewer from unexpected program con-
tent .... Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children, even those too young to read.58
Notably, the FCC's ruling, upheld by the Court, did not
prevent broadcast of the "indecent" monologue in an appro-
priate late-night time frame when fewer children were likely
to be in the listening audience."
Types of communication media that fall between print
and broadcast in terms of First Amendment protection are
those in which the listener must take affirmative steps to re-
54. Id. at 747-48.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 750. "[A] nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong
place-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Id. (quoting Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).
57. See id. at 750-51.
58. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748-49 (citation omitted). "The difficulty is
that.., a physical separation cannot be accomplished in the broadcast media.
During most of the broadcast hours, both adults and unsupervised children are
likely to be in the broadcast audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing
adults without also reaching children." Id. at 758-59 (Powell, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
59. See id. at 733. "[The FCC] never intended to place an absolute prohibi-
tion on the broadcast of this type of language, but rather sought to channel it to
times of day when children most likely would not be exposed to it." Id. (quoting
the FCC's published opinion in 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976)).
[Vol. 40
CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT
ceive the speech." Examples of media that receive this in-
termediate level of protection include telephone communica-
tions6 and cable television.6 2  In Sable Communications of
California, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court considered a fed-
eral statute that imposed a total ban on both obscene and in-
decent interstate commercial telephone messages.63 The ap-
pellant, a commercial provider of sexually oriented,
prerecorded "dial-a-porn" telephone messages, sought to en-
join the FCC and the Justice Department from enforcing the
statute.64 The Court distinguished between "obscene" and
"indecent" dial-a-porn recordings, holding "obscene" record-
ings were not protected by the First Amendment.65 However,
the Court held that "indecent" sexual expression is protected
speech and any abridgment thereof must meet strict scru-
tiny." While the Court concluded that the government had a
compelling interest in "protecting children from exposure to
indecent dial-a-porn messages,"6" it ultimately held that the
statute at issue was not narrowly tailored to achieve this
end.66 The Court stated that there are less restrictive means
available to limit minors' access to dial-a-porn, while still al-
lowing adults free access.69 Such means include requirement
of payment by credit card, authorization by access code, and
use of message scrambling technology, requiring use of a cus-
tomer-owned descrambler, the sale of which could be re-
stricted to adults. ° The Court concluded that "the govern-
ment may not reduce the adult population.., to... only
60. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-28
(1989).
61. See id.
62. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994);
Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
63. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 115.
64. See id. at 117-18.
65. See id. at 124. "W7e have repeatedly held that the protection of the First
Amendment does not extend to obscene speech." Id.
66. See id. at 126. "The government may... regulate the content of consti-
tutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it
chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest .... It is
not enough to show that the government's ends are compelling; the means must
be carefully tailored to achieve those ends." Id.
67. Id. "We have recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting
the physical and psychological well-being of minors." Id.
68. See id.
69. See Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 128.
70. See id.
1999] 229
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what is fit for children,"7' even in the face of the compelling
interest of protecting minors."
B. The Internet-A New Communication Medium
1. History of the Internet
The nature of the Internet is difficult to define.73 It is not
a tangible entity, but rather a giant "network of networks,"7 a
worldwide linking of smaller computer networks to each
other.7" The Internet originated in 1969 as ARPANET, a
network of linked computers, developed to enable the mili-
tary, defense contractors, and universities to access and ex-
change information.' The Internet is now available to virtu-
ally anyone with access to a computer and a modem.77 The
number of Internet users is expected to grow to 200 million
this year."
The Internet is a global communication medium that al-
lows users to communicate almost instantaneously with other
users in any part of the world." No single entity controls in-
formation flow on the Internet nor is there a single central-
ized information storage location. 0 Indeed, "it would not be
technically feasible for a single entity to control all of the in-
formation conveyed on the Internet."8
A popular approach to information retrieval on the Inter-
net is through searching the "World Wide Web" ("Web").
82
Documents retrieved from the Web can be displayed in a va-
riety of formats including "text, images, sound, animation,
and moving video."" Searching for web sites by category or
key word is accomplished through use of commercial "search
71. Id. (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
72. See id. at 131.
73. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-38 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd 521
U.S. 844 (1977).
74. Id. at 830.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 831.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
80. See id. at 832.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 836.
83. Id.
[Vol. 40230
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engines."' Further, any Web document may contain "links"
to other Web documents, allowing users to efficiently access
related information.85 "The power of the Web stems from the
ability of a link to point to any document, regardless of its
status or physical location.""6 "The World Wide Web was cre-
ated to serve as the platform for a global, online store of
knowledge, containing information from a diversity of sources
and accessible to Internet users around the world."87
2. Content on the Internet
"It is no exaggeration to conclude that the content on the
Internet is as diverse as human thought."" The Internet con-
tains a vast array of content that is both commercial and non-
commercial in nature.89 Many noncommercial entities main-
tain web sites solely for the dissemination of information for
the public's benefit.0 The Internet is an especially attractive
means for a nonprofit organization to convey information to a
potential audience of millions.91 The cost for dissemination of
information via the Internet is very low relative to other
forms of media. 2 In addition, interactive content is available
through e-mail, chat rooms, and newsgroups.93 Interactive
modes of communication allow speakers to become listeners
and vice-versa, thereby blurring the traditional distinctions
between these two groups." The Internet is "arguably the
most powerful tool for sharing information ever developed."95
Due to its low cost and vast audience, the Internet is an
attractive means for disseminating sexually explicit mate-
rial.96 Sexually explicit material available on the Internet
ranges "from the modestly titillating to the hardest core. "97
Due to the far-ranging nature of search engine results, "[i]t is
84. See id. at 837.
85. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 836.
86. Id. at 837.
87. Id. at 836.
88. Id. at 842.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842-43.
92. See id. at 843.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 843-44.
95. Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634, 638 (E.D. Va. 1998).
96. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 844.
97. Id.
19991
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possible that a search engine can accidentally retrieve mate-
rial of a sexual nature through an imprecise search."98 Sexu-
ally explicit material is not the most prevalent form of con-
tent on the Web, but it is just as easy to create and access as
any other form of information on the Internet.99
A federal statute prohibiting interstate transportation of
obscene material for commercial purposes has been extended
to the Internet. 00 In United States v. Thomas, the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals upheld application of the statute to pro-
scribe commercial transmission of obscene material via the
Internet.' However, content-based restrictions on Internet
access to nonobscene, sexually explicit material have been
held unconstitutional in two recent cases in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia."2 In Urofsky v. Al-
len, the court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute re-
stricting access by state employees to sexually explicit mate-
rial.' The court held that the statute violated employees'
First Amendment rights.0 The statute did not survive strict
scrutiny analysis because the government could not show a
compelling interest' 5 and because content-neutral alterna-
tives existed.' Similarly, in Mainstream Loudoun v. Board
of Trustees,"°' the court held unconstitutional a public library
policy prohibiting library patrons from viewing sexually ex-
plicit content0 8 via library Internet access facilities. The
98. Id.; see also ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
A child with minimal knowledge of a computer, the ability to operate a
browser, and the skill to type a few simple words may be able to access
sexual images and content over the World Wide Web. For example,
typing the word "dollhouse" or "toys" into a typical Web search engine
will produce a page of links, some of which connect to what would be
considered by many to be pornographic web sites. These web sites offer
"teasers," free sexually explicit images and animated graphic image
files designed to entice a user to pay a fee to browse the whole site.
Id.
99. See ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
100. See 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994).
101. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 74 (1996).
102. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D.
Va. 1998); Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998).
103. Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. 634.
104. See id. at 644.
105. See id. at 639.
106. See id. at 643.
107. Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
108. See id.
[Vol. 40232
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court found the policy "overinclusive because, on its face, it
limits the access of all patrons, adult and juvenile, to material
deemed fit for juveniles." 9
A large percentage of Internet content, estimated at forty
percent or more, originates in foreign countries."' "Foreign
content is otherwise indistinguishable from domestic content
(as long as it is in English), since foreign speech is created,
named, and posted in the same manner as domestic
speech .... It is undisputed that some foreign speech that
travels over the Internet is sexually explicit.""'
Access to any type of Internet "content requires a series
of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely
turning a dial [to receive radio or television broadcasts]." 2 A
user must have access to a computer with a modem and must
enter a password to connect with the service provider."' On
the Web, the user must utilize a search engine or enter a site
address to access particular information."' Usually, a docu-
ment's title or a description of the document will appear be-
fore a user takes the required steps to view the content of a
document."' "Almost all sexually explicit images are pre-
ceded by warnings as to the content. [Therefore,] 'odds are
slim' that a user would come across a sexually explicit site by
accident.""' 6
C. Regulation of Speech on the Internet
1. Non-Statutory Regulation of Speech on the Internet
a. Content Provider-Based Regulation
In a voluntary industry attempt to restrict access by chil-
dren to age-inappropriate Internet content, the World Wide
Web Consortium formed a group called "Platform for Internet
Content Selection" ("PICS"). The members of PICS include "a
broad cross-section of companies from the computer, commu-
109. Id. at 563.
110. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 848 (E.D. Pa. 1996), afd 521 U.S.
844 (1997).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 845.
113. See id. at 844.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 844-45.
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nications, and content industries, as well as trade associa-
tions and public interest groups."117 The goal of PICS is to de-
velop a rating system that will allow parents to filter content
on the Web."8 The PICS rating specifications have been
agreed upon and the Internet community is beginning to de-
velop PICS-compatible filtering products and services."'
Other available content provider-based restrictions in-
clude credit card verification and age verification by pass-
word.2 Many commercial entities already use these tech-
nologies to restrict access to their sites.' However, these
methods are prohibitively expensive to noncommercial con-
tent providers.' Moreover, in cyberspace there is no way to
ensure that the user of a credit card or an adult password is
in fact an adult."'
b. User-Based Regulation
In addition to provider-based regulation of Internet ac-
cess, user-based restriction is also available through use of
commercial blocking software products. These products en-
able adults to filter and limit the scope of Internet access
available to children."4 Products such as Cyber Patrol and
Surf Watch employ search term blocking methodologies."5
Parents can use these products to selectively block access to
desired categories such as "Violence/Profanity," "Sexual Acts,"
"Racism/Ethnic Impropriety," etc."' Cyber Patrol updates its
"CyberNOT" list on a weekly basis, blocking new Web sites in
the prohibited categories as they become available."7  "The
market for this type of software is growing, and there is in-
creasing competition among software providers to provide
products.""8 However, Web-savvy minors can find sites de-
voted to instructing them on how to circumvent blocking
117. Id. at 838-39.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 839; see also David K Djavaherian, Reno v. ACLU, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 371, 383-84 (1998).
120. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 856 (1997).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 1996).
122. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 881.
123. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 847.
124. See id. at 839.
125. See Djavaherian, supra note 119, at 386.
126. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 840.
127. See id. at 840-41.
128. Id. at 839.
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software products.'9  "Moreover,.... seemingly innocuous
search terms often lead to pornographic links. Thus, search
term blocking does not provide a significant bar to minors' ac-
cess of online indecency." 3°
Additional services available from commercial online
providers include "tracking and monitoring software to de-
termine which resources a particular online user (e.g., a child)
has accessed [and] children-only discussion groups that are
closely monitored by adults."3' These tools can help adults
monitor and limit Internet access by children in their homes.
2. Federal Statutory Regulation of Internet Speech
a. The Communications Decency Act of 1996
The first congressional attempt to regulate Internet con-
tent was the Communications Decency Act of 1996.12 The
CDA "Prohibit[ed] the knowing transmission of obscene or in-
decent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age"'33 (the
"indecent transmission provision") and "prohibit[ed] the
knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages
in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years of
age" '4 (the "patently offensive display provision"). The CDA
imposed criminal penalties upon anyone who violated either
of these two provisions."' In addition, the CDA provided two
affirmative defenses to violation of the statute.' One defense
"cover[ed] those who take 'good faith, reasonable, effective,
and appropriate actions' to restrict access by minors to the
129. See, e.g., <http://www.peacefire.org.html> (visited Dec. 21, 1998). This
site contains detailed instructions for disabling Cyber Patrol, Surf Watch, Cyber
Sitter, and several other blocking products.
130. Djavaherian, supra note 119, at 386.
131. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion For a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 12, ACLU v. Reno,
1998 WL 813423 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1998) (No. VIC.A.98-5591) (visited Dec. 21,
1998) http://www.epic.org/free-speechlcopa/tro-brief'html [hereinafter Plain-
tiffs' Mem. ].
132. The CDA embodies Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
signed into law by President Clinton on February 8, 1996. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223
(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1997). For the text of pertinent portions of the CDA, see
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859-60 (1997).
133. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859 (1997) (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)
(West Supp. 1997)).
134. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)).
135. See id. at 860.
136. See id. at 860-61.
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prohibited communications.""7 The other defense "cover[ed]
those who restrict access to covered material by requiring cer-
tain designated forms of age proof, such as a verified credit
card or an adult identification number or code."138
Immediately after the CDA was signed into law, a large
group of plaintiffs, including the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"), filed suit in federal district court, challeng-
ing the constitutionality of both the indecent transmission
and the patently offensive display provisions.'39 A limited
temporary restraining order was granted, followed by the
convening of a three-judge panel to consider the case, as re-
quired by one of the provisions of the CDA.'4° After extensive
fact-finding and an evidentiary hearing, the three-judge panel
unanimously granted a preliminary injunction against en-
forcement of both challenged provisions."' The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held the
challenged provisions unconstitutional. 4'
b. Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU I")
In Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU "), the Supreme Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of the CDA by comparison with
three of its previous decisions.' The Court first compared
the CDA to the statute upheld in Ginsberg v. New York,'
which prohibited the sale to minors of material "harmful" to
them.' The Court concluded that the statute in Ginsberg
was narrower in scope than the CDA in four important re-
spects.'46 First, the "harmful to minors" language in the
Ginsberg statute did not prevent parents from purchasing the
prohibited materials for their children if they so desired. "7 In
contrast, under the CDA, parental consent or participation in
the prohibited communications would not shield parents from
137. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1997)).
138. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(B) (West Supp. 1997)).
139. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd 521 U.S.
844 (1997).
140. See id.
141. See id. at 849.
142. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 885.
143. Id. at 864.
144. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968);
145. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 865; supra Part II.A.2.
146. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 865.
147. See id. (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639).
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criminal liability.'48 Second, the statute in Ginsberg applied
only to commercial transactions, 9 whereas the CDA did not
contain such a limitation."' Third, the New York statute in-
cluded a requirement that material deemed harmful to mi-
nors be "utterly without redeeming social importance for mi-
nors,, 1" a requirement missing from the CDA."' Fourth, the
CDA applied to those under eighteen years of age, as opposed
to the seventeen-year-old age restriction in Ginsberg."'
The Court next considered the CDA in light of its holding
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation."' As with Ginsberg, the Court
found the restriction upheld in Pacifica to be narrower in
scope than the CDA."' First, the FCC order upheld in
Pacifica targeted a specific "indecent" daytime radio broad-
cast and merely designated an appropriate alternate time
frame for airing future broadcasts of that nature. In con-
trast, the "CDA's broad categorical prohibitions are not lim-
ited to particular times and are not dependent on any evalua-
tion by an agency familiar with the unique characteristics of
the Internet.""' Second, the CDA imposed criminal sanctions,
whereas the FCC's declaratory order in Pacifica did not."'
Third, Pacifica concerned a broadcast medium that has his-
torically received limited First Amendment protection."9
However, the Internet is a new communication medium and
has no such history of attenuated First Amendment protec-
tion.6  The historical limitation on the scope of First
Amendment protection for radio stems from the concern that
radio listeners are a "captive audience" and cannot be ade-
quately protected from unexpected offensive program content
without such limitations.'' In contrast to radio, "the risk of
encountering indecent material by accident [on the Internet]
148. See id.
149. Id. (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 647).
150. See id.
151. Id. (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646).
152. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 865.
153. See id.
154. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see supra Part II.A.2.
155. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 867.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 867.
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is remote because a series of affirmative steps is required to
access specific material."162
A third previously decided case considered by the ACLU I
Court was Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.13 Renton con-
cerned a local zoning ordinance that prevented adult movie
theaters from locating in residential neighborhoods." "The
ordinance was aimed, not at the content of the films shown in
the theaters, but rather at the 'secondary effects'-such as
crime and deteriorating property values-that these theaters
fostered.""' In contrast, the CDA was a blanket content-
based restriction on speech, regulating the primary effects of
"indecent" and "patently offensive" speech, rather than any
secondary effects of such speech. 66 Therefore, the Court
found that the "time, place, and manner" analysis used in
Renton did not apply to the CDA.'67
The ACLU I Court proceeded to discuss the medium-
specific analysis it had previously used to determine the ap-
propriate levels of First Amendment protection afforded other
communication media." Factors such as a history of exten-
sive government regulation, a scarcity of available frequen-
cies at a medium's inception, and a medium's "invasive" na-
ture are considered when attenuating First Amendment
protection for a particular communication medium.6  The
Court found that
[t]hose factors are not present in cyberspace.
Neither before nor after the enactment of the
CDA have the vast democratic forums of the
Internet been subject to the type of governmental
supervision and regulation that has attended the
broadcast industry. Moreover, the Internet is
not as 'invasive' as radio or television."0
The Court concluded that its "cases provide no basis for quali-
fying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be
162. Id.
163. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
164. See id.
165. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 867.
166. See id.
167. See id. (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 46).
168. See id. at 868.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 868-69.
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applied to this medium."'' The Court likened the Internet to
other forms of media that require affirmative steps to receive
content,"2 such as the telephone.
The Court held the CDA void for vagueness because of its
failure to define the terms "indecent" and "patently offen-
sive.""' In addition, the Court found that the CDA was over-
broad because "[it] effectively suppresses a large amount of
speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and
to address to one another""' and because the means were not
narrowly tailored' 6 to the compelling "governmental interest
in protecting children from harmful materials."'77 The Court
suggested that less restrictive means may be available in the
form of "tagging" indecent material to facilitate parental con-
trol, allowing exceptions for material with artistic or educa-
tional value to minors, regulating commercial providers dif-
ferently from noncommercial entities, and providing a degree
of latitude with respect to parental choice.
78
Finally, the Court considered the two affirmative de-
fenses provided by the CDA.' 79 The first defense applied when
a defendant "[had] taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective,
and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or
prevent access by minors ... [utilizing] any method which is
feasible under available technology."8 ° The Court found this
defense unattainable because of the lack of existing technol-
171. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 870.
172. See id.
173. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128
(1989). "Placing a telephone call is not the same as turning on a radio and being
taken by surprise by an indecent message." Id.
174. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 871-72.
The vagueness of the CDA is a matter of special concern for two
reasons. First, the CDA is a content-based regulation of speech.
The vagueness of such a regulation raises special First Amend-
ment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech.
Second, the CDA is a criminal statute .... The severity of crimi-
nal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather
than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and im-
ages.
Id. (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 874.
176. See id. at 879. "[W]e are persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tai-
lored if that requirement has any meaning at all." Id.
177. Id. at 875.
178. See id. at 879.
179. See id. at 881-82.
180. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
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ogy by which content providers may effectively restrict access
only to minors.' The second defense applied when the
speaker restricted access by use of credit card verification or
adult access code technologies."' The Court concluded that
although these technologies are viable, they are economically
prohibitive to most noncommercial speakers'8 and therefore
"place[] an unacceptably heavy burden on protected speech."184
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part.'88 O'Connor considered
the CDA as a type of adult "zoning" ordinance that purports
to "segregate indecent material on the Internet into certain
areas that minors cannot access."'86 She construed previous
Supreme Court precedent as upholding an adult zoning law
when "(i) it does not unduly restrict adult access to the mate-
rial; and (ii) minors have no First Amendment right to read or
view the banned material."'87 She found that the CDA did not
pass muster because it violated the first part of the test by re-
stricting adult access to protected speech.' 88  Further,
O'Connor distinguished Ginsberg. The statute upheld in
Ginsberg created "a constitutionally adequate adult zone sim-
ply because, on its face, it denied access only to minors."88
Since the nature of cyberspace is such that it "allows speakers
and listeners to mask their identities,"'0 there is currently no
available technology that allows for creation of a constitu-
tional adult zone. Such a zone would limit access to minors
181. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 882.
182. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(B) (West Supp. 1997).
183. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 881. The Court also noted that "the Government
failed to adduce any evidence that these verification techniques actually pre-
clude minors from posing as adults." Id. at 882.
184. Id. at 882.
185. See id. at 886.
186. Id. "The creation of 'adult zones' is by no means a novel concept. States
have long denied minors access to certain establishments frequented by adults.
States have also denied minors access to speech deemed to be 'harmful to mi-
nors.'" Id. at 887.
187. Id. at 888.
188. See id. at 897. "Our cases make clear that a 'zoning' law is valid only if
adults are still able to obtain the regulated speech. If they cannot, the law does
more than simply keep children away from speech they have no right to ob-
tain-it interferes with the rights of adults to obtain constitutionally protected
speech .... The First Amendment does not tolerate such interference." Id. at
888.
189. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 889.
190. Id. at 889-90.
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while preserving First Amendment freedoms for adults.191
c. The Child Online Protection Act
In an attempt to remedy the constitutional defects of the
CDA, 92 Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act,
which was signed into law in October 1998.' The COPA pro-
vides that any speaker who knowingly makes a communica-
tion for commercial purposes that is available to any minor
and includes material that is "harmful to minors," shall be
subject to criminal penalties, including a fine of up to $50,000
and up to six months imprisonment.'94 Intentional violations
accrue a criminal fine of up to $50,000 for each day of viola-
tion,195 and civil penalties of up to $50,000 for each day of
violation are available as well.19
A speaker is considered to make a communication for
commercial purposes "only if such person is engaged in the
business of making such communications ... with the objec-
tive of earning a profit as the result of such activities."'97 It is
not necessary, however, that the speaker actually make a
profit for violation of the statute to occur."'
Under the COPA, a minor is defined as any person under
seventeen years of age.'99 Material that is "harmful to mi-
nors" is defined as anything that is obscene or that (a) the av-
erage person, applying contemporary community standards
with respect to minors, would find to be designed to appeal or
pander to the prurient interest; (b) describes or represents in
a patently offensive manner with respect to minors, "an ac-
tual or simulated sexual act or contact... or a lewd exhibi-
tion of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast"; and (c)
"taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors." °°
The COPA provides affirmative defenses to entities that,
191. See id. at 890-92.
192. See id. at 882.
193. See Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998)).
194. See 47 U.S.C. at § 231(a)(1) (1998).
195. See id. § 231(a)(2).
196. See id. § 231(a)(3).
197. Id. § 231(e)(2)(A)-(B).
198. See id. § 231(e)(2)(B).
199. See id. § 231(e)(7).
200. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (1998).
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in good faith, restrict access to minors by (a) "requiring use of
a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult per-
sonal identification number"; (b) "accepting a digital certifi-
cate that verifies age"; or (c) "any other reasonable measures
that are feasible under available technology."
20 1
Immediately after enactment of the COPA, the ACLU
and a variety of plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Act on First and Fifth Amendment grounds,
and seeking to enjoin its enforcement."' The district court
judge, in ACLU v. Reno ("ACLU IT'), granted a temporary re-
straining order,0 3 followed by a preliminary injunction. 4 He
stated that "plaintiffs have established a substantial likeli-
hood that they will be able to show that COPA imposes a
burden on speech that is protected for adults."0 ' The district
judge also found that even though "Congress has a compelling
interest in the protection of minors, including shielding them
from materials that are not obscene by adult standards,"2 6 "it
is not apparent... that the [government] can meet its burden
to prove that COPA is the least restrictive means available to
achieve [this interest]."27 At this time, the preliminary in-
junction remains in effect and the parties are preparing for a
full trial to determine the constitutional merits of the
COPA.
20 8
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
This comment addresses the issue of whether the COPA
is a constitutionally valid restraint on speech. The Internet is
a widely used, inexpensive medium through which individu-
als may communicate information and ideas to a worldwide
audience.2 9 Therefore, if the COPA is held to be constitu-
tional, its impact on this nation's "free trade in ideas" 210 will
201. Id. at § 231(c).
202. ACLU v. Reno, No. CIV.A.98-5591, 1998 WL 813423 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23,
1998).
203. Id.
204. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
205. Id. at 495.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 497.
208. See ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
209. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd 521 U.S.
844 (1997).
210. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
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be significant. Internet content providers whose activities fall
within the language of the COPA, but who cannot afford to
implement the affirmative defenses, will be forced to self-
censor their online material to avoid severe criminal penal-
ties. ' This "chilling effect" on speech is proscribed by the
First Amendment, unless narrowly tailored to achieve a com-
pelling government interest.1 '
In ACLU I, the Supreme Court held that attempts to
regulate speech on the Internet should be examined under
strict scrutiny.2 ' Therefore, the COPA must survive strict
scrutiny to be upheld. 4 This comment explores the question
of whether the COPA is an effective and narrowly tailored
means for accomplishing the government objective of pro-
tecting minors from sexually explicit material. Two factors of
special consideration in this discussion are (1) the unavail-
ability of means for Internet speakers to ascertain the iden-
tity and age of recipients,21 and (2) the fact that a great deal
of Internet content originates outside of the United States.1 6
These two factors hinder government efforts to regulate the
content of material reaching minors through measures such
as the COPA. Alternative user-based controls will be dis-
cussed, and an entirely new form of regulation, in the form of
an "adult zoning" scheme, will be proposed.1 '
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Comparison of the COPA with the CDA
In drafting the COPA, Congress sought to remedy the
constitutional defects of the CDA. '18 The COPA is narrower in
scope than the CDA and was designed to address some of the
criticisms of the CDA expressed in the ACLU I opinion.1 9
211. See ACLU v. Reno, No. CIV.A.98-5591, 1998 WL 813423, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 23, 1998).
212. See id. at *2.
213. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
214. See ACLU, 1998 WL 813423, at *1.
215. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
216. See id. at 848.
217. See infra Part V.
218. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 8 (1998) (visited Dec. 21, 1998)
<http'//www.epic.org/free-speech/censorship/hr3783-report.html>.
219. See id. at 6. '[The COPA] has been carefully drafted to respond to the
Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU,... and the Committee believes that
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First, responding to the finding that the CDA's undefined "in-
decent" and "patently offensive" standards were overly vague,
Congress changed the content standard to "harmful to mi-
nors," and provided a definition for this standard within the
statute." Second, responding to the Court's criticism that
the CDA was overbroad, Congress limited the scope of the
COPA to commercial transactions.2 2'  The COPA does not
prohibit or regulate noncommercial activities on the Inter-
net.222 Third, responding to the Court's concern that the CDA
abridged parental choice, the COPA "contains no restriction
on the discretion of the parent to purchase material for their
children who are under age [seventeen]."22 In line with re-
stricting the scope of the COPA to commercial entities, Con-
gress provided defenses in the forms of credit card verification
and adult access codes.224 In ACLU I, the Court concluded
that these devices are "not only technologically available but
[currently are] used by commercial providers of sexually ex-
plicit material."225
Although narrower in scope than the CDA, the COPA
still contains flaws that render it unconstitutional. For ex-
ample, the new "harmful to minors" standard, although ar-
guably less vague than the "indecent" and "patently offensive"
standards of the CDA, still proscribes content that is pro-
tected speech for adults.2 6 Therefore, the COPA is a content-
based regulation of protected speech and as such is presump-
tively invalid.22' When ACLU I goes to trial, the government
will bear the heavy burden of showing that the COPA is nar-
rowly tailored to effectuate a compelling governmental inter-
est.2 8 This will be a formidable hurdle because to date "the
the bill strikes the appropriate balance between preserving the First Amend-
ment rights of adults and protecting children from harmful material on the
World Wide Web." Id.
220. See id. at 12.
221. See id. at 13.
222. See id. at 12-13.
223. Id. at 14.
224. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 14 (1998) (visited Dec. 21, 1998)
<http://www.epic.org/free-speech/censorship/hr3783-report.html>.
225. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 881 (1997).
226. ACLU v. Reno, No. CIV.A.98-5591, 1998 WL 813423, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 23, 1998). "Nonobscene sexual expression is protected by the First
Amendment." Id.
227. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992).
228. See ACLU, 1998 WL 813423, at *1.
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Supreme Court has never upheld a criminal ban on non-
obscene communications between adults. 29
Furthermore, although the COPA purports to apply only
to commercial content providers, it also restricts speech by
noncommercial entities that provide free content on the
Web.8 ° Communications made "for commercial purposes," as
defined in the COPA, occur "only if [a] person is engaged in
the business of making such communication.., with the ob-
jective of earning a profit as a result of such activities.23 '
Thus, under the wording of the COPA, the definition of com-
munication for commercial purposes involves merely at-
tempting to earn a profit, rather than the actual commercial
sale of content.32 Many Web content providers endeavor to
earn a profit while providing free online material to the pub-
lic. 2
33
[M]any Web publishers [like traditional newspapers and
magazines] generate revenues through advertising. In
addition, content providers such as online booksellers,
music stores, and providers of art services allow potential
customers to browse their content for free-similar to
browsing in an actual book store or art gallery. Finally,
some online content providers make a profit by charging
their content contributors, although users may access con-
tent for free.234
To Web publishers who are earning a profit without
making commercial sales over the internet, the COPA's af-
firmative defenses are prohibitively expensive.3 5 The cost for
setting up a credit card or age verification system has been
estimated to cost between $20,000 and $30,000.236 The
monthly cost for a large web site with 100,000 visitors per
month could be as high as $200,000 each month. 3 ' This cost
will turn an otherwise inexpensive resource for communicat-
ing with a broad audience into an unaffordable one for many
229. Plaintiffs'Mem., supra note 131, at 10.
230. See id. at 9.
231. ACLU, 1998 WL 813423, at *4.
232. See Plaintiffs'Mem., supra note 131, at 9.
233. See id.
234. Id. (citations omitted).
235. See ACLU, 1998 WL 813423, at *3.
236. See Plaintiffs'Mem., supra note 131, at 10.
237. See id.
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content providers. 38 The economic burden will force some
content providers to close their web sites. 39 The large expen-
diture required for setting up a verification system is unfeasi-
ble for many noncommercial web site operators who, under
the COPA, will have the unpalatable choices of either shut-
ting down their sites for fear of prosecution, facing severe
criminal penalties of up to $50,000 per day for continuing to
provide constitutionally protected speech, or passing the cost
of age verification onto their users.40 "To require users to pay
the fee would be the equivalent of requiring bookstores to
charge people before they could enter the store to browse
through a single book, and would have a devastating impact
on [content providers'] businesses, because most users would
be unwilling to pay for the information. "241 As in ACLU I, the
district court in ACLU If found that the likely effect of the
COPA would be the self-censorship of online material by con-
tent providers.2 "This chilling effect will result in the cen-
soring of constitutionally protected speech, which constitutes
an irreparable harm to [online content providers]."43
The COPA provides the same defenses as the CDA. The
ACLU I Court found these defenses to be inadequate on two
grounds: (1) there is no way of assuring that a credit card or
password user is in fact an adult; and (2) the defenses are cost
prohibitive to noncommercial web sites. 4' The Court in
ACLU I affirmed the district court's finding that "[i]mposition
of a credit card requirement would completely bar adults who
do not have a credit card and lack the resources to obtain one
from accessing any blocked material."245 In addition, the dis-
trict court found that "[t]here is evidence suggesting that
adult users, particularly casual Web browsers, would be dis-
couraged from retrieving information that required use of a
credit card or password."246 Credit card or age verification re-
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See ACLU, 1998 WL 813423, at *4.
241. Plaintiffs'Mem., supra note 131, at 17.
242. See ACLU, 1998 WL 813423, at *3.
243. Id. at *3. "It is well established that the loss of First Amendment free-
doms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable
injury." Id. (quoting Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72-73 (3d Cir. 1989)).
244. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 881-82 (1997).
245. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 846 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844
(1977).
246. Id. at 847.
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quirements prevent adults from obtaining sensitive or contro-
versial information anonymously."" "Some [content provid-
ers] communicate sensitive and personal information involv-
ing gay and lesbian issues, safer sex, and medical health....
[M]any users [may] be deterred from accessing their re-
sources if they could not do so anonymously."248 Anonymous
communication is a protected First Amendment right4 9 and
the requirement of verification systems under the COPA in-
fringes upon this right.
B. The COPA Will Not Survive Strict Scrutiny
Any content-based restriction on speech such as the
COPA must be reviewed under a strict scrutiny analysis."'
Although the Supreme Court has applied a less stringent
analysis to some other forms of communication media,' the
Court in ACLU I held that previous decisions "provide no ba-
sis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that
should be applied to [the Internet]."25 '
Strict scrutiny requires a three-part analysis: "(1)
whether the interests asserted by the state are compelling; (2)
whether the limitation is necessary to further those interests;
and (3) whether the limitation is narrowly drawn to achieve
247. See Plaintiffs'Mem., supra note 131, at 11.
248. Id. at 20; see also ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 849.
Anonymity is important to Internet users who seek to access
sensitive information, such as users of the Critical Path AIDS
Project's Web site, the users, particularly gay youth, of Queer
Resources Directory, and users of Stop Prisoner Rape (SPR).
Many members of SPR's mailing list have asked to remain
anonymous due to the stigma of prisoner rape.
Id.
249. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
"[Anonymity] exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First
Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation-
and their ideas from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant society." Id.; see
also Fabulous Assoc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780, 787 (3rd
Cir. 1990) (striking down adult access code requirement for accessing telephone
messages which were "harmful to minors"). "[An access code requirement] im-
poses a burden on the exercise of the callers' First Amendment rights and chills
the message services' protected speech." Id.; ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, 977 F.
Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (striking down a Georgia statute which made it a
crime for Internet users to falsely identify themselves online).
250. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
251. See supra Part II.A.2.
252. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
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those interests."253 Arguably the government has a compel-
ling interest in protecting children from material that might
be harmful to them. 54 However, as demonstrated below, the
COPA is neither necessary nor narrowly tailored to achieve
this end.
First, the COPA is not a necessary limitation to further
the protection of children, because obscenity and child por-
nography are already illegal under existing federal law.255
Specifically, transmission of obscenity via the Internet is al-
ready prohibited by statute.25 ' Further, there is concern that
the COPA may actually hinder law enforcement efforts to
curb unlawful material on the Web. In a letter addressed to
Congress, the Department of Justice expressed concern that
"enforcement of a new criminal prohibition such as that pro-
posed in the COPA could require an undesirable diversion of
critical investigative and prosecutorial resources that the De-
partment currently invests in combating traffickers in hard-
core child pornography, in thwarting child predators, and in
prosecuting... commercial distributors of obscene materi-
als."57 In addition, the Department of Justice expressed an
uncertainty as to "whether the COPA would have a material
effect in limiting minors' access to harmful materials,"258 since
there are noncommercial sources such as news groups and
chat rooms, as well as foreign-based web sites, that contain
pornographic material but are not regulated by the COPA.255
Ironically, commercial purveyors of pornography, who gener-
ally already require a credit card for access, are protected un-
der the COPA's affirmative defenses. 6° Noncommercial sites
are also protected under the COPA, if they are not attempting
to make a profit.26' In sum, only a small subset of sites actu-
ally fall within the COPA's ambit. Therefore, because the
bulk of sexually explicit material online will not be regulated
253. Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 564-65
(E.D. Va. 1998).
254. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
255. See Plaintiffs'Mem., supra note 131, at 20.
256. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
257. L. Anthony Sutin, Department of Justice Letter Regarding COPA, at 2
(visited Dec. 23, 1998) <http://aclu.org/court/acluvrenoII-dojjetter.html>.
258. Id.
259. See id.
260. See Plaintiffs'Mem., supra note 131, at 6, 16.
261. See id. at 12.
[Vol. 40248
CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT
under the COPA, the statute will be ineffective at achieving
the stated government interest of preventing minors from ac-
cessing harmful material.
The defenses of credit card and age verification will not
prevent minors from accessing the prohibited material. Some
minors have credit cards or have access to their parents'
cards, so "verification techniques [will not] preclude minors
from posing as adults."62 In addition, "even when companies
do attempt to obey the law, some adult verification measures
can easily be thwarted. For instance, Web sites that demand
proof of adult status only at their home page can easily be ac-
cessed by anyone who knows the exact address of other pages
at the site."26
Second, the COPA is not narrowly drawn to achieve the
government interest of protecting the well-being of children.
The statute is both vague and overbroad and there are less
restrictive means available. Although the statutory language
of the COPA is arguably more well-defined than the language
of the CDA, the COPA nevertheless contains provisions that
will lead to difficulties in interpretation and enforcement.
For instance, the COPA's "'harmful to minors' standard fails
to distinguish between material that is harmful to teenagers
and material that is harmful to young children."" The Court
fails to identify which standard is controlling. In addition, it
is not clear from the language of the COPA which "contempo-
rary community standards" must be used to judge the harm-
ful effects of particular Internet content."' Since the Internet
is a global medium, it is impossible for an online content pro-
vider to ascertain the standards of each community that could
potentially access its material. 6 In ACLU I, the Court stated
that the CDA's "'community standards' criterion as applied to
the Internet means that any communication available to a
nation-wide audience will be judged by the standards of the
262. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997).
263. Stephen Buel, Web Porn Sites Stay Unfiltered, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Nov. 19, 1998, at Al.
264. L. Anthony Sutin, Department of Justice Letter Regarding COPA, at 4
(visited Dec. 23, 1998) <http://aclu.org/court/acluvrenoII-dojletter._html>.
"Must the material, taken as a whole, lack[] serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value' for all minors, for some minors, or for the 'average' or reason-
able' 16-year-old minor?" Id. (citations omitted).
265. See id.
266. See Plaintiffs'Mem., supra note 131, at 23-24.
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community most likely to be offended by the message,"67 and
concluded that the CDA was not narrowly tailored. 68
Further, the COPA, like its predecessor the CDA, is over-
broad in scope because there is no way to restrict minors' ac-
cess to Internet speech without also limiting access by adults.
Since there is no way to ascertain the age of a recipient of
Internet content,6 9 this statute will reduce speech on the
Internet to the level of what is acceptable for children. As the
Supreme Court affirmed in ACLU I, "'[r]egardless of the
strength of the government's interest' in protecting children,
'the level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be
limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.'"
2 70
The COPA is not narrowly tailored because less restric-
tive means are available. Less restrictive means include
user-based blocking programs 271' and tracking services avail-
able through Internet Service Providers that monitor the web
sites children visite. 2" These solutions have the added advan-
tage of placing control of the content children may access in
the hands of their parents rather than with the government.
"[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized
that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to
direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of
our society."
73
C. Analysis of the COPA as a "Zoning" Regulation
The COPA, like the CDA, attempts to create an "adult
zone" on the Internet.174 Under Justice O'Connor's analysis in
ACLU I, a zoning law will be upheld only if it does not restrict
adult access and only if minors have no right to read the pro-
267. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 877-78.
268. See id. at 879.
269. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion For a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 24, ACLU v. Reno,
1998 WL 813423 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1998) (No. VIC.A.98-5591) (visited Dec. 21,
1998) <http://www.epic.org/free-speech/copa/tro_brief.html>.
270. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 875 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60 (1983)).
271. See supra Part II.C.l.b.
272. See id.
273. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
274. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 886 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); see also Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyber-
space, 45 EMORY L.J. 869 (1996).
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hibited material in the first place. 7' The COPA, like the
CDA, restricts adult access as a consequence of the method
used to restrict minors' access and therefore fails to create a
constitutional adult zone. In Ginsberg, the statute prohibit-
ing access of minors to "harmful" material did not restrict ac-
cess to the same material by adults. 7' This is because the
statute in Ginsberg restricted the sale of harmful content to
children, and in physical space, as opposed to cyberspace, it is
easy for a vendor to ascertain whether or not he is selling to a
minor.277 "[R]estrictions [in physical space] can be effective
because most who would try to escape them (kids) can't easily
escape identifying themselves as kids .... [I]n the process of
making or not making a sale, the seller knows that it is a
child to whom he is selling."278 In Ginsberg, the statute re-
quired no censorship of material by a vendor. Conversely, a
content provider on the Internet has no effective way of ascer-
taining the age of a content recipient.2 1 "Cyberspace allows
speakers and listeners to mask their identities.... [I]t is not
currently possible to exclude persons from accessing certain
messages on the basis of their identity."211 Since the age of
individual recipients cannot be determined in cyperspace,
Internet content must be self-censored in order to avoid viola-
tion of the COPA.
The Court has upheld physical space zoning regulations
in cases such as Renton.2 1 However, the difference between
the adult theater zoning regulation upheld in Renton and the
COPA is that Renton focused on the secondary effects, such as
crime, that accompany the placing of adult theaters in par-
ticular neighborhoods,2 2 rather than on content per se. The
COPA, on the other hand, focuses directly on the content of
speech. A constitutional cyberspace zoning regulation would
need to address the secondary effects of Internet pornography
(i.e., harm to minors) without also limiting adult access to
protected speech.
The COPA is similar to the prohibition of dial-a-porn
275. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 889.
276. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
277. See Lessig, supra, note 274, at 886.
278. Id.
279. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 889-90.
280. Id.
281. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
282. See id.
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struck down in Sable."'3 The Internet, like the telephone, "re-
quires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the
communication."284 The district court in ACLU I found that
"[c]ommunications over the Internet do not.., appear on
one's computer screen unbidden.... [R]eceipt of information
on the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps.... 285
Further, just as it is impossible for a speaker on the telephone
to see across the telephone line to determine the age of a lis-
tener, it is likewise impossible for a content provider on the
Internet to ascertain the age of a content recipient on the
other end of the modem. In either medium, a restriction on
content that places responsibility on the speaker is an inap-
propriate attempt at zoning. This is because in any medium
in which the age of a listener cannot be determined, a speaker
would have to reduce the content to the level appropriate for
children. This is what would happen under the COPA and
what renders it unconstitutional. "Surely this is to burn the
house to roast the pig."28
6
V. PROPOSAL
Statutes such as the COPA and the CDA attempt to
regulate online speech by making Internet content providers
responsible for differentiating between adult and child recipi-
ents of sexually explicit material. The problem with regula-
tions of this type, as applied to the Internet, is that there is
no way for an Internet "speaker" to know the age of the lis-
tener.287 Anonymity is a hallmark of Internet communica-
tions. 88 Even if a recipient uses a credit card or adult access
code, it is impossible for a content provider to know whether
the recipient is an adult or merely a child posing as an
adult.8 This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the gov-
ernment to meet its burden of showing that a measure such
as the COPA is an effective and narrowly tailored means of
preventing minors from accessing sexually explicit material.
283. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); see su-
pra Part II.A.2.
284. Id. at 128.
285. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844-45 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd 521 U.S.
844 (1997).
286. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
287. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 889 (1997).
288. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 849.
289. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 882.
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To comply with a regulation like the COPA, Internet speakers
who cannot afford the very expensive defenses offered under
the Act will have to tailor messages, which are constitution-
ally protected speech for adults, to a level acceptable for chil-
dren.29° This is prohibited by the First Amendment.29'
An alternative to provider-based regulation like the
COPA is a user-based solution that will allow parents to block
their children's access to certain types of material. The gov-
ernment could mandate a rating system to be applied to
commercial Internet content providers. This would allow
parents to block web sites that do not fit a selected profile. To
effectuate this system an agreed-upon "tag" would have to be
imbedded in Internet content that would identify certain sites
as "harmful to minors." "' A multi-tiered rating system could
exist, allowing parents to decide what level of material is ap-
propriate, based on the age and maturity of their own child.
The technology for tagging already exists.293 Internet service
providers could provide screening software that would allow
parents to block access to sites that are rated inappropriate
by the parent. Tagging is more effective than the keyword
searches currently used by blocking software because the tag
is a universal code instead of one of many words that might
be present at a given sexually explicit site.
The Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) con-
sortium is attempting to facilitate user-based regulation by
developing a universal rating system for Internet sites.294
"When fully implemented, PICS-compatible World Wide Web
browsers ... and other Internet applications will provide par-
ents the ability to choose from a variety of rating services, or
a combination of services."295 PICS currently functions as a
"positive" rating system. 6 Sites that are not rated are simply
not displayed. 7
A positive rating system such as PICS can provide a con-
290. See ACLU v. Reno, No. CIV.A.98-5591, 1998 WL 813423, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 23, 1998).
291. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
292. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 847.
293. See id.
294. See supra Part II.C.l.a.
295. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 838.
296. See id. at 839.
297. See id.
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stitutional "adult zone"298 that will circumvent several of the
difficulties inherent in implementation of the COPA. First,
sites blocked with respect to minors will still be accessible to
adults. This prevents the "chilling" of speech that would oc-
cur if web sites had to self-censor their online material to
avoid prosecution.299 Second, this type of scheme will not im-
pose the financial hardship on Web providers of implementa-
tion of an expensive credit card verification or adult password
system.3 ° Restriction of access will occur automatically by
the software that screens for the PICS rating tag. Rated sites
will be automatically excluded from minors' viewing access if
they contain harmful content. Third, this system preserves
user anonymity. Access is controlled by the adult user rather
than by the content provider, eliminating the need for credit
card verification or use of an adult access code. Finally, a
great deal of sexually explicit content on the Internet origi-
nates outside of United States jurisdiction.0 1 With a positive
rating scheme, unrated foreign-based sites will simply not be
visible to minors.
As in Renton,"°2 establishment of a PICS-type "adult zone"
restricts the secondary effects of speech (i.e., harm to minors)
rather than the content. Instead of imposing a blanket con-
tent-based restriction on sexually explicit speech, the content
is simply "zoned" to an adults-only area in cyberspace. This
type of methodology enables the government to realize its ob-
jective of assisting parents with "the protection of the physi-
cal and psychological well-being of [their children] by shield-
ing them from materials that are harmful to them."0 3
Parents may choose the content they feel is appropriate for
their own child, while content providers will not have to face
a choice between criminal prosecution or self-censorship of
their online material.
The government could mandate a rating system or, pref-
erably, could cooperate with an industry group such as PICS
298. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
299. See ACLU v. Reno, No. CIV.A.98-5591, 1998 WL 813423, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 23, 1998).
300. See id. at *3.
301. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 848.
302. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1985); see supra
Part II.C.2.b.
303. H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 2 (1998) (visited Dec. 21, 1998)
<http'/www.epic.org/free-speech/ censorship/hr3783-report.html>.
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to develop appropriate standards for rating web sites. Fur-
ther, unlike the COPA and the CDA, a positive rating system
will pass constitutional muster because of its ability to create
an adequate "adult zone."3' Children may be excluded from
the zone, while adults are free to receive speech and partici-
pate in a "free trade in ideas""5 in cyberspace.
VI. CONCLUSION
The COPA, Congress's second attempt to regulate speech
on the Internet, has been constitutionally challenged.306 The
COPA purports to shield minors from harmful Internet mate-
rial by imposing severe criminal penalties on commercial web
sites unless they either screen for the age of recipients or re-
duce the content on their sites to material that is acceptable
for children to view. 7 Since it is impossible for an Internet
content provider to know the age of a recipient,3 8 compliance
with age screening procedures is not an effective means of
preventing harm to minors.30 ' Furthermore, web site provid-
ers that cannot afford to implement the expensive screening
procedures will have to self-censor their online material,
causing a "chilling effect" on speech and effectively preventing
adults from accessing constitutionally protected speech.310
The COPA is not narrowly tailored to the government's inter-
est of protecting minors and therefore violates the First
Amendment. This comment proposes a less restrictive means
of providing protection to minors, while preserving freedom of
expression for adults on the Internet. An adult-activated
method for restricting access by minors based on a universal
rating system of Internet content, will enable parents to
choose the type of content they want their children to view,
while still allowing free access by all adults to the vast vari-
ety of online material in cyberspace.31'
304. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
305. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing).
306. See ACLU v. Reno, No. CIV.A.98-5591, 1998 WL 813423 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
23, 1998).
307. See id.
308. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 855 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd 521 U.S.
844 (1977).
309. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997).
310. See ACLU, 1998 WL 813423, at *3.
311. See supra Part V.
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